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Introduction: some key terms 
 
In media, communication and cultural studies these days, as in much of the rest of life, it·s 
PRUHRUOHVVLPSRVVLEOHWRDYRLGWKHWHUP¶GLJLWDO·2QHLPSRUWDQWTXHVWLRQRIWHQUDLVHGEXW
rarely explored in depth, is whether digitalization has democratized the media industries and 
media production. In order to consider this question, we need to seek clarity concerning the 
main terms. 
The term media industries refer to those industries involved in the production and 
circulation of cultural products via communication media such as television, radio, film, 
newspapers, magazines, recorded music and others. The various processes of media 
production that are pursued by these industries matter because they shape the kinds of 
knowledge, culture and entertainment that we are most likely to experience. 
Digitalization here refers to electronic storage and transmission that involves converting 
images, words, sounds and so on into binary code that can be read and stored by 
computers ² including those embedded in mobile phones. Digital communication 
technologies are simply communication devices based on such electronic storage and 
transmission, and computerization ² including computers interconnected by the internet ² 
is essential to the idea of digitalization 
The term democratization is the trickiest of the three terms in my question. Etymologically, 
GHPRFUDF\RIFRXUVHUHIHUVWRUXOHE\DQGIRU¶WKHSHRSOH·demos, in ancient Greek). More 
specifically, it involves the idea that participants in something (a society, a city, an 
organization) exercise collective decision-making over that thing in a relatively equal way 
(Christiano 2018). In the context of the media, and media industries, then, democratization is 
often used simply to refer to an increase in access, either to making or consuming media 
products. There is a more radical sense of the term though, where it is used to refer to change 
that might improve or reform the media by bringing about greater levels of equality in 
collective decision-making over the operations of the media. This matters, because 
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undemocratic media processes are likely² at least according to the proponents of 
democratization ² to lead to problems in media products, such as inadequate representation, 
voice and visibility for less powerful, marginalized groups, and this can have significant 
negative effects on participation, equality, justice and democracy across all kinds of other 
spheres in society. Yet the question of the degree of democracy in media production (as 
opposed to the degree to which media content might be considered democratic or 
progressive) has been neglected in recent years. 
 
New media technologies as democratizing forces 
 
Over the last century and more, since the rise of commercial media industries in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, there have been many hopes that various new 
communication technologies would democratize the media (e.g., Brecht 1978/1932). Such 
hopes are only part of a larger history of aspirations for the transformative capabilities of 
machines and systems, including railways and electricity. But when applied to the 
communication media, such hopes have a particular significance, because the very idea of 
communication itself concerns the limits and possibilities of connection between humans (see 
Peters 1999). 
Even the use of supposedly transformative communication systems such as radio by Nazis 
and other authoritarians failed to dent the idea that new technologies might transform 
information, knowledge and communication for the better. In the period following the 
Second World War, computers became a new basis for such utopian hopes, because of the 
possibility that their potentially vast storage and processing capacities would make it much 
easier for large numbers of people to access massive bodies of information, cheaply and 
conveniently, thereby democratizing knowledge ² in the sense of broadening access to it 
(Turner 2004). The rapid development of computers in the post-war era was fuelled by 
government expenditure on research in an era where the USA-OHGZRUOGRI¶OLEHUDO
GHPRFUDFLHV·DQGWKH6RYLHW8QLRQ-led bloc of Communist countries competed for 
supremacy. As early as the 1950s and 1960s, it seemed clear that computers would transform 
societies and economies, and this generated a flurry of theories and predictions concerning 
WUDQVLWLRQVWRZDUGV¶WKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\·RU¶WKHNQRZOHGJHHFRQRP\·*DUQKDP 
The idea that technologies in themselves can have effects on anything, whether media 
production or human happiness, needs to be qualified. Technologies, as Thomas Streeter 
SXWVLW¶DUHGHHSO\HPEHGGHGLQDQGVKDSHGE\VRFLDOSURFHVVHVDQGFKRLFHVDQGVR
should not be thought of as sometKLQJRXWVLGHRIRUDXWRQRPRXVRIVRFLHW\·:KLOH
WHFKQRORJLFDOREMHFWVDQGV\VWHPVKDYH¶DIIRUGDQFHV·² qualities that define how they might be 
used²discussion of the affordances of technologies always needs to involve consideration of 
other factors shaping their use: economic, political, cultural, psychological. 
6XFKLPSRUWDQWTXDOLILFDWLRQVWRVLPSOLVWLF¶WHFKQRORJLFDOGHWHUPLQLVP·VKRXOGQRWKRZHYHU
blind us to the fact that the development of complex technological systems do tend to have 
pretty major consequences ² though always in interaction with other forces. And there can be 
little doubt that digitalization, the incursion of computing into communication on a massive 
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scale, has had considerable effects on media, and on media industries. For example, we can 
point to ways in which our access to communication is now far more ubiquitous, mobile and 
pervasive than in the past, with various consequences for how we act and behave. These are 
important in their own right, but my focus here is specifically on the extent to which 
digitalization has led to democratization, in the sense of a meaningful opening-up of the 
means of media production to greater democratic control. 
Media industries in the twentieth century: four major characteristics 
 
To explore this question, I want to begin by identifying four main sets of characteristics of the 
media industries in the late twentieth century. The industrialization of culture and 
communication brought a new degree of cultural abundance and choice to many sections of 
modern societies and forged new forms of community and solidarity. But the media 
industries were hardly democratic, in the sense I mooted above, where collective decision 
making over how the media operate is exercised in some relatively equal way by those 
affHFWHGE\WKHP,QRXWOLQLQJVRPHRIWKHVHFKDUDFWHULVWLFV,·OODOVRH[SODLQEULHIO\KRZVRPH
FRPPHQWDWRUVZKRP,·OOODEHO¶GLJLWDORSWLPLVWV·DWHUP,WDNHIURP7XUQHUWKRXJK
many others have used it), felt that these features could be democratized by the development 
of digital networks.1 The rest of the chapter will then explore the degree to which those hopes 
were realized. 
My approach here is underpinned by the idea that, when considering the effects of 
digitalization, we need to place the changes associated with digital networks in long-term 
historical context. Seeing digitalization through cultural and historical lenses can help us to 
avoid widespread errors in discussions of the effects of new technologies: a tendency to 
overstate the importance and depth of recent changes, and a failure to spot underlying 
dynamics that remain in place, even in periods of seemingly chaotic transformation. 
1. Mix of state and private ownership ² and the rise of corporations 
 
By the middle of the twentieth century, in most countries where significant industrialization 
had occurred, the media industries were dominated by three main types of organization: 
large state-owned and state-funded organizations, such as the British Broadcasting 
Corporation, China Central Television and ,QGLD·VDoordarshan; private companies, often 
FRQWUROOHGE\IDPLOLHVRUZHDOWK\LQGLYLGXDOVDQG¶SXEOLF·FRUSRUDWLRQV² businesses whose 
ownership shares were listed on stock exchanges, and therefore in principle open for anyone 
to buy, but in fact almost entirely owned by wealthy institutions such as banks. In some 
countries, notably the United States, these public corporations had a legal obligation to make 
profits and accrue assets on behalf of shareholders. Large firms, especially in industries such 
as recorded music and book publishing, co-H[LVWHGZLWKPDQ\VPDOOHU¶LQGHSHQGHQW·
companies supplying particular niches, from horror fiction to rhythm and blues. While at 
times some of these companies could serve audiences and even workers well, such small 
                                                     
1 )RUUHDVRQVRIVSDFH,FDQ·WGLVFXVVGLJLWDORSWLPLVPLQGHWDLOKHUHEXW,GRVRLQ+HVPRQGKDOJK²322. 
My thanks to Jeremy Morris and Kaarina Nikunen for their very helpful comments on this chapter. 
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businesses could be as crudely commercial and exploitative as the bigger companies. 
 
Driving the process whereby larger and larger companies gained greater control over the 
media industries were certain systemic features of media markets under capitalism. The 
media industries were relatively high-risk ventures for businesses and investors, but ones 
where the rewards for market dominance could be considerable ² including fame and 
glamour, as well as profits. The high levels of risk derived in part from the fact that it is 
hard for anyone to know which media products will succeed, because it is hard to predict 
what pleasures and rewards media audiences might have, as tastes and fashions change. 
Even audiences themselves do not know for sure what pleasures and rewards a media 
product will offer because each product tends to be somewhat different from others. All 
this favoured companies who could produce large catalogues, to spread the risk. 
Systems that mixed state, private and public ownership and control sometimes created many 
media products that were entertaining, informative, and enriching, and many where such 
qualities seemed subsumed by commercial intent. Some owners used profits to subsidize 
high-quality investigative journalism, for example. The global recording industry from time 
to time enabled (and at the same time appropriated) the sharing of wondrous music across 
national borders (Denning 2015). Sometimes such content was available to working-class and 
marginalized groups as well as the bourgeoisie. But this system was not in any meaningful 
sense democratic. In the large companies that came to dominate media in most countries (for 
reasons outlined below), power was mainly exercised by managers acting on behalf of 
wealthy owners and senior executives. Justifications of this market system of media 
SURGXFWLRQUHVWHGRQWKHLGHDWKDWSURILWVFRXOGEHDFKLHYHGRQO\E\¶JLYLQJSHRSOHZKDWWKH\
ZDQWHG·and therefore a profit-based system encouraged the satLVIDFWLRQRISHRSOH·VGHVLUHV
But there were some major problem with this claim. For one thing, what people wanted was 
WRVRPHH[WHQWVKDSHGE\WKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQPHGLDWKHPVHOYHV)RUDQRWKHUSHRSOH·VGHVLUHV
exist in complex relations to their needs and their well-being. 
Organizations representing the interests of citizens, workers and marginalized groups made 
massive efforts to create alternative systems, resulting in significant networks of media 
YDULRXVO\WHUPHG¶LQGHSHQGHQW·¶DOWHUQDWLYH·¶UDGLFDO· DQG¶XQGHUJURXQG·VHH'RZQLQJ
2000) but such networks frequently lacked the resources to compete with the for-profit 
companies and state institutions. Where the latter were run by fascist and Stalinist 
governments, there could be little hope of the media being operated on democratic grounds. 
In some so-FDOOHG¶OLEHUDOGHPRFUDFLHV·SUHVVXUHIURPJURXSVUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHLQWHUHVWVRI
workers led to some state organizations making efforts to serve publics in a relatively 
egalitarian way, but they were paternalist ² authoritarians with a conscience (Williams 1968: 
131). Control over, and access to these organizations, was mostly limited to an elite of white, 
privileged, highly educated men ² the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is the 
paradigmatic example. But the same was even more true of many of the for-profit 
businesses. 
By the 1980s and 1990s, as advertising budgets grew, and as global markets became more 
interconnected in an era of media regulation, media markets became bigger and more 
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international. Many of the state-owned companies were privatized. The rest had to compete 
with commercial firms that had access to greater financing from other firms. A series of 
mergers led to the creation of vast multinational media corporations. 
Critique of such arrangements was widespread from the earliest days of the media 
LQGXVWULHVRIWHQDVSDUWRIFRQFHUQVDERXWWKHTXDOLW\RI¶PDVVFXOWXUH·LQDQHUDZKHUHDQ
abundance of commercially-oriented media products seemed to be swamping older cultures 
associated with religion and art. It was in this context that leftist commentators in particular 
began to hope that new technologies (such as radio) might allow communities and political 
parties to forge their own media, separately from the media industries system just outlined. 
%\WKHVDQGVDGLVWUXVWRI¶PDLQVWUHDPPHGLD·KDGFURVVHGSROLWLFDOOLQHVLQPDQ\
countries, and there was a hope that digitalization would be the ultimate democratizing tool 
for fighting the domination of media-industry corporation and of media control by 
authoritarian governments (Pool 1983). 
2. The importance of copyright; poor compensation and inequalities for media workers 
Underpinning modern systems of wealth accumulation is property, and the growing media 
industries of the twentieth century were dependent on systems of intellectual property, 
especially copyright, that had developed significantly from their origins in the eighteenth 
century. One way of understanding the importance of copyright is to see that media 
LQGXVWULHVGHDOLQZKDWHFRQRPLVWVFDOO¶SXEOLFJRRGV·² goods that are not used up in 
consumption. If I watch a film, that does not stop anyone else being able to watch it, whereas 
if I drink a beer or a medicine, no-one else can. This meant that as the media developed, there 
ZDVDQHHGWRFUHDWH¶DUWLILFLDOVFDUFLW\·LQRUGHUIRUEXVLQHVVHVWRDFFUXHUHYenues, either by 
direct sales, advertising or subscriptions. Such artificial scarcity was achieved by copyright 
law and practice, which penalized organizations and individuals who reproduced or 
otherwise used protected words, images and sounds without the permission of the copyright 
owner. While originally formulated as a way of protecting creators (such as authors), most 
rights came to be owned by large businesses, and as copyright grew in importance, those 
businesses became highly effective at lobbying governments to increase the scope and 
duration of copyright, and to monitor infringements more rigorously. 
This system of copyright law and practice enabled the growth of the media industries, but it 
was hardly democratic: it protected corporate owners more than creators or users. Nor were 
the media labour systems of which copyright formed a central part. The revenues from sales 
RUXVHRIFRS\ULJKWHGSURGXFWVZHQWWR¶ULJKWVRZQHUV·:KRRZQHGWKHULJKWVLQSDUWLFXODU
works was determined by contracts between the various parties involved, in which bigger 
companies generally had the upper hand. Creative workers, operating as freelancers, would 
often be paid on the basis of royalties, calculated as a percentage of revenues. The media 
industries became notorious for poor contract practices, and often it was people from 
communities with little access to formal legal knowledge or advice that suffered, such as 
African-American musicians. Other workers were salaried, but had little or no stake in 
ownership, or access WRUR\DOWLHV:KDW·VPRUHDVWKHPHGLDLQGXVWULHVEHFDPHDVVRFLDWHG
with glamour and celebrity, this helped to feed an oversupply of willing workers, 
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suppressing wages and working conditions for most workers, and feeding inequalities of 
class, sex and ethnicity, because it tended to be better-off and better-educated people who 
were able to find means to cope with the long periods of insecure employment necessary to 
gain access to worthwhile media work. These features were challenged only by a small, 
idealiVWLFFRRSHUDWLYHDQG¶DOWHUQDWLYH·VHFWRU'RZQLQJDQGHYHQWKLVVHFWRU
sometimes reproduced the dynamics of class inequality, racism and sexism apparent in the 
¶PDLQVWUHDP· 
 
By the 1990s, digital optimists were hopeful that the increasing ability of networked 
computers to share information, knowledge and entertainment would lead to an erosion of 
the problematic copyright system outlined above, permitting greater degrees of collective or 
public ownership and access to media products (Lessig 2001 was one major participant in 
such debates). Many digital optimists, however, paid little attention to questions of working 
conditions and inequalities in working life, or to how media industries might be owned and 
managed in the new environment, and this limited their capacity for understanding 
democratization. 
3. Media production by the few, distributed to the many 
 
Across the media industries, there developed massive asymmetry between, on the one hand, 
audiences, by the early twentieth century existing on a scale unimaginable before 
industrialization, and on the other, a relatively small (though steadily growing) group of 
professional producers (Williams 1981). In the highly centralized media systems of the late 
twentieth century, it was possible for relatively small numbers of media producers and 
celebrities to command enormous degrees of attention ² and wealth. Of course nearly 
everyone has the ability to be a cultural producer, to sing a song, tell a story, or draw a 
picture. The spread of technologies such as photography and cheap musical instruments 
DPSOLILHGWKLVKXPDQFDSDFLW\DQGGHYHORSHGDPDVVRI¶DPDWHXUV·%XWYHU\IHZRIWKRVH
amateurs were ever able to reach a substantial audience. 
Digital optimists hoped that digital networks would allow this mass of empowered amateurs 
to communicate with each other, bypassing professional systems and gatekeepers 
(Leadbeater 2004; Shirky 2008). But as we shall see, they failed to appreciate the resilient 
nature of certain features of the media industries. The problems for audiences of knowing 
what pleasures and rewards might be available from media products (see Characteristic 1 
above) means that there is huge incentive for companies to control the marketing and 
publicity of media products, so that audiences can be persuaded to spend their money or time 
on a particular product. This consistently leads to vertical integration, whereby large firms 
gain control over distribution or circulation, as well as production. While digitalization 
enabled more 
and more people ² LQFOXGLQJ¶DPDWHXUV·² to create cultural products independently of the 
mainstream system outlined in characteristic 1, the problem remained of how to allow 
sufficient people to be aware of such products that they might experience them. 
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4. Overproduction and blockbusters 
In a situation where it was so hard to predict which products will succeed, there was an 
incentive for companies to create lots of product, and try them out by releasing them to the 
public, publicizing some more than others, but  hoping that even the less publicized might 
find an audience. This helped fuel the growth of larger media companies through the 
twentieth century, as the most successful companies grew quickly and swallowed up smaller 
ones. It also brought about an overproduction of media goods. To make products stand out 
IURPWKLVDEXQGDQFHODUJHUILUPVGHYRWHUHVRXUFHVWRFUHDWLQJ¶EORFNEXVWHU·SURGXFWVRIWHQ
with high budgets for recognizable star talent, and for promotion and marketing. Because of 
the risky nature of predicting audience demand, even blockbusters often fail, but the ones 
that succeed can be hugely profitable, because of another fundamental feature of media 
industries: it is quite expensive to develop a media product, but relatively cheap, and 
sometimes extremely cheap, to reproduce it (e.g., making extra copies of a book or newspaper 
or recording). This meant that profits grew exponentially if a product was a hit: once the 
initial costs were covered, each extra sale of products or audiences could be very lucrative. 
Both strategies (big catalogues and blockbusters) favour the large companies, but the 
blockbuster tendency or syndrome tends to be the main way in which the big corporations 
exercise and maintain their power (Grant and Wood, 2004). They are sometimes brilliantly 
entertaining and imaginative and sometimes even politically progressive (such as 
'LVQH\0DUYHO·VBlack Panther, 2018). In order to achieve a wide audience, they often strive to 
appeal across different communities (classes, ethnicities, nations). Yet blockbusters are in 
many respects deeply undemocratic. They are only producible by large corporations with 
huge financial backing. They tend to take up a disproportionate amount of cultural attention, 
RIWHQRQDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOVFDOHWKHUHE\¶FURZGLQJRXW·PRUHORFDOL]HGquirky, lower-budget 
offerings. 
Digital optimists were, as we shall see, hopeful that digitalization would see the end of the 
WZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\·V¶EORFNEXVWHUV\QGURPH·OHDGLQJWRDQLPSOLFLWO\PRUHHJDOLWDULDQDQG
therefore possibly more democratic system based on serving media niches (Anderson 2006). 
Unfortunately, like so many other optimistic predictions about the effects of digitalization, 
WKLVGLGQ·WKDSSHQ 
 
The development of digital networks in the context of marketization: four 
consequences 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, two notable developments occurred, which in 
many respects intensified the features outlined above, but which also seemed to offer the 
possibility of significantly disrupting them. One development was that governments began to 
open up media markets to much greater levels of national and international competition. 
6RPHKDYHUHIHUUHGWRWKLVWHQGHQF\LQPHGLDDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQSROLF\DV¶GHUHJXODWLRQ·
EXWSHUKDSVDPRUHDFFXUDWHWHUPLV¶PDUNHWL]DWLRQ·+HVPRQGKDOJK²74): an 
increasing tendency to see the media as best organized via the buying and selling of products 
DQGVHUYLFHVLHYLD¶PDUNHWV·:KLOHWKLVDOORZHGLQFXPEHQWVWREHFKDOOHQJHGE\QHZ
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entrants, it hardly altered the nature of the system, it simply made it more profit-oriented. 
State-run companies in telecommunications, broadcasting and other sectors were sold off, 
creating new business opportunities for investors and companies, who began to see the 
media industries as a promising source of returns. Because of the centrality of television to 
contemporary culture and to cultural business, the development of multi-channel television 
and radio, via cable, satellite and eventually digital television, was a particularly important 
fulcrum of change. 
The second development was the rise of the digital networks that are the main way in which 
digitalization has manifested itself in media. While audio-visual technologies such as cable 
and satellite dominated many predictions of the media future in the 1970s and 1980s, at the 
same time, developments in computing and digital networks were beginning to appeal to 
policy-makers. In North America and Europe, businesses and policy-makers were 
increasingly attracted to ICTs because they offered the potential to gain advantage over 
¶QHZO\LQGXVWULDOL]LQJ·QRQ-western nations and businesses (notably Japan, Korea, Singapore, 
Malaysia) that had increasingly come to dominate manufacturing industries. From the 1970s, 
as computers rapidly became smaller, cheaper, faster and more accessible, replacing the giant 
mainframe computers of an earlier period, they began to be connectable in networks 
(Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, 2004). There was a growing prospect that computers would 
enable faster and more reliable communication, and this added greatly to the excitement ² 
and anxiety ² DERXWLGHDVRI¶WKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\·DQG¶WKHNQRZOHGJHHFRQRP\·,QLWLDOO\
access to networked computers by those outside the military-industrial complex, including 
the early internet, and much of the excitement surrounding them, was confined to academic 
communities and amateur enthusiasts. Both these groups saw computers as contributing to 
the emancipation and democratization of information and knowledge (Turner 2004; Streeter 
2011). A vital development was the rapid growth of the World Wide Web, which built on and 
embodied the principles of open-ness crucial to the development of the internet. As policy 
decisions paved the way for the opening up of digital networks beyond academic 
FRPPXQLWLHVLQWKHVWKH:HE·VRSHQ-ness inadvertently provided the basis for an 
increasing use of the internet for commercial ends (Keen 2015: 34²74). Not much later, mobile 
telephony systems reached a point where they began to operate in effect as networks of 
connected micro-computers. 
At the turn of the century, digital networks had only just begun to have effects on the main 
communication media of the twentieth century, upon which the above account is based: 
television, radio, film/cinema, newspapers, magazines and musical recordings. Between 1990 
and 2010, there was a frenzy of prophecies as commentators and analysts extrapolated 
futures, on the basis of what was at that time only just emerging. Many of the predictions 
were about how digital technologies would enable businesses to make profits more 
effectively ² a strand of writing that continues to this day. But the legacy of understandings 
of computers as a basis for democratization of knowledge and information, meant that there 
was also considerable optimism about the impact of digital technologies on media and 
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cultural production.2 The optimistic predictions had a ¶SHUIRUPDWLYH·UROHUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHLU
accuracy or otherwise: they played a vital part in legitimating government, business and 
consumer decisions, by making the onset of digital networks in a particular form seem not 
only desirable, but inevitable. It is only now, nearly twenty years on, with digital networks as 
an embedded aspect of everyday life, that we can discuss what has actually happened, rather 
than what people thought might amidst the confusion of constant innovation. I want to do so 
here by asking to what extent the major characteristics outlined in the previous section have 
really chanJHGDQGZKHWKHUWKHUHKDVEHHQDQ\FKDQJHWKDWZHPLJKWFDOO¶GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ· 
in the sense outlined at the start, to refer to meaningful democratic control. I do so by 
analyzing four outcomes (or sets of outcomes) of digitalization: 1) challenges to the copyright 
system, and to the main ways in which media industries gain revenues; 2) the phenomenon 
of user-JHQHUDWHGFRQWHQWDQGWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKLWRYHUWXUQHGWKH¶IHZ-to-PDQ\·V\VWHP
outlined above; 3) the continuing power of corporations, and the rise of a new set of titans 
based on information technology; 4) a continuation of the few-to-many and blockbuster 
systems outlined above. 
Outcome one: initial erosion of media industry revenues but limited challenge to copyright and 
labour systems 
The costs of producing relatively high-quality images and sounds, at least in some media and 
genres, had already declined rapidly with the digitalization of production in the 1980s and 
1990s. Key technologies included desk-top publishing, high-quality digital video and editing 
software, and computer-based music recording software that allowed musicians in certain 
JHQUHVWRFUHDWH¶EHGURRPVWXGLRV·)URPWKHHDUO\VRQZDUGVGLJLWDOQHWZRUNVQRZ
enhanced by third-generation mobile telephony, enabled not only cheaper production, but 
also relatively easy and inexpensive distribution, potentially on an international scale. In 
these circumstances, it seemed possible, even probable, that digitalization was threatening the 
domination of media corporations that had marked the late twentieth century (see 
Characteristic 1 above). On the news and journalism side, it was frequently claimed that large 
news organizations would diminish in power, and that digital networks would bring about 
the rise of a wider and more diverse rangHRIVRXUFHVLQFOXGLQJ¶FLWL]HQPHGLD·5RVHQ
see also Anderson in this volume, on the early interest in blogging and in ventures such as 
Indymedia). The great English rock star David Bowie was by no means alone in predicting 
WKDW¶WKHDEVROXWHWUDQsformation of everything we thought about music will take place in the 
QH[WWHQ\HDUV·LQFOXGLQJWKHHOLPLQDWLRQRIFRS\ULJKWDQGWKHUDSLGGHFOLQHRIUHFRUGODEHOV
(Pareles 2002). 
The first major developments took place in music, partly because music requires less digital 
                                                     
2 Among examples of those who, criticized such optimism from a more realistic position, see Mosco 2004. Until 
around 2010, the voices of pessimists were much less widely heard, and this in itself is revealing of the way that 
the digital was embraced and even fetishized in the early twenty-first century. See Curran, Fenton and 
Freedman (2016) for an excellent critical overview of many claims about the internet. 
 
 
10  
capacity than many other cultural forms. Peer-to-peer file-sharing sites such as the first 
incarnation of Napster (1999²2001) were used primarily to share content that had been 
created professionally within the music industries system, rather than to share the work of 
amateurs and emerging professionals. Their main impact was to damage the artificial scarcity 
that sustained the sale of recordings to consumers (see Characteristic 2). Unsurprisingly, they 
met with a furious response from rights owners, especially the major music recording and 
publishing companies, whose clumsy efforts to control file-sharing through legal action 
DJDLQVW¶RUGLQDU\·GRZQORDGHUVDQGWRGHYHORSV\VWHPVWKDWZRXOGOLPLWFRS\LQJOHGWRWKHP
being treated even in mainstream media accounts either as doomed dinosaurs, or as 
vindictive defenders of their privilege and power, or both (Gillespie 2007; Morris 2015). 
Many people felt that what happened in recorded music augured changes in other industries 
primarily dependent on sales of goods made artificially scarce through copyright controls, 
such as book publishing, games and feature films; and even television was worried, as the 
valuable secondary market of DVD sales began to be eroded. The amounts that could be 
charged IRU¶OHJDO·LHQRQ-pirate) physical sales of artefacts plummeted from the artificially 
high levels that had sustained excessive profits for many years. 
7KHPRVWLPPHGLDWHLPSDFWRIRQOLQHGLVWULEXWLRQRQPHGLDLQGXVWULHVZDVRQ¶EULFNVDQG
PRUWDU·UHWailing, i.e., bookshops, record shops and so on, and the key player here was 
Amazon, which between 1995 and 2005 became the dominant international force (alongside 
eBay) in online shopping. Retailers selling records and books, or selling and renting games 
and videos, closed down across the world (Herbert 2014). Many of the people running these 
enterprises were completely uninterested in questions of cultural democratization, and record 
and book stores could be intimidating spaces for the uninitiated. But such shops, perhaps 
HVSHFLDOO\LQGHSHQGHQWVRSHUDWHGDV¶JDWKHULQJSODFHVWKDWDOORZSHRSOHRULHQWHGWRFXOWXUH
WRPHHWDQGFRQQHFW·7LPEHUJSURYLGLQJDQLQIRUPDOFXOWXUDOHGXFDWLRQIRU
JHQHUDWLRQVRISURGXFHUVDQGDXGLHQFHV:KDW·VPRUHWKLVZas a sector in which cooperative 
and independent ownership had sometimes thrived (see Fraser 1992: 67 on feminist 
ERRNVWRUHVDVPHHWLQJSODFHVIRU¶VXEDOWHUQFRXQWHUSXEOLFV·:KLOHPDQ\VXFKVKRSVVWUXJJOH
on, and some even manage to flourish, they have often disappeared from places where they 
might be needed most ² towns beyond the metropolitan cores (The Economist 2011). 
From the early 2000s onwards, digitalization also began to have significant impacts on 
advertising revenues, and this had especially strong effects on newspapers and magazines. 
Many publications set up online sites, keen not to be left behind in the transition to digital, 
but often making their products freely available, and thereby damaging sales of their core 
SURGXFW:KDW·VPRUHWKHVH online versions of newspapers and magazines had to compete 
ZLWKQHZ¶ERUQGLJLWDO·QHZVVLWHVDQGQHZFXOWXUDODFWLYLWLHVVXFKDVVRFLDOPHGLDIRU
DXGLHQFHV·DWWHQWLRQWRLQIRUPDWLRQDQGHQWHUWDLQPHQW7KLVDOVRPHDQWeven more 
competition for declining advertising expenditure, especially as many of the new digital 
companies (especially Google in search, and Facebook in social media) claimed to be able to 
target audiences much more effectively as a result of their ability to collect huge amounts of 
data and to join up different datasets. Advertising expenditure on newspapers and 
periodicals fell from around 2006²07 onwards, as internet expenditure soared 
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(Hesmondhalgh 2019: 303) and employment in newspapers fell rapidly in many countries, 
leading to discusVLRQRIDFULVLVLQMRXUQDOLVPDQGHYHQ¶WKHGHDWKRIQHZV·.DPL\D
0F&KHVQH\DQG1LFKROVVHHDOVR&:$QGHUVRQDQG0LFKDHO6FKXGVRQ·VHVVD\VLQWKLV
volume). 
There is no doubt that digitalization had damaging effects on media-industry revenues and 
on the retail sector. But these effects hardly represented democratization. Although there was 
a certain freeing-up of the way in which people used copyrighted material, for example in 
phenomena such as mash-ups and memes, systems of copyright law and practice remained 
intact. The rise of digital streaming services (see also Outcome Four below) represents the 
main way in which the challenge of digitalization to such notions of intellectual property has 
been contained. In music, online music streaming services such as Spotify, Apple Music and 
WKRVHRSHUDWHGE\&KLQD·VTencent represent the new core of global music business revenues, 
offering consumers instant availability of vast catalogues of music (tens of millions of tracks 
on the largest services), either for free, i.e., paid for on the basis of advertising, or for a 
monthly subscription fee. Similarly, in television, subscription video-on-demand (SVOD) 
VWUHDPLQJVHUYLFHVVRPHWLPHVFDOOHG¶RYHUWKHWRS·VHUYLFHVEHFDXVHWKH\E\SDVVWKHFDEOH
systems that dominate US television, have challenged the linear, scheduled viewing that 
dominated television even in the era of the digital video recorder (Holt and Sanson 2013). The 
FRQWHQWRQVXFKVWUHDPLQJVHUYLFHVLVDEXQGDQWDQGFRQYHQLHQWDYDLODEOH¶DQ\WLPe, 
DQ\ZKHUH·DWOHDVWZKHUHWKHUHLV a wi-fi connection for those who can afford the relevant 
equipment and subscriptions. But in the era of streaming, the system of rights and ownership 
underpinning the media industries system are if anything more deeply embedded in 
technological systems (Gillespie 2007) and more removed from democratic debate than ever. 
This also applies to the unjust and undemocratic systems of labour and compensation which 
are, as we saw in Characteristic 2 above, underpinned by copyright law and practice (as well 
as by general labour law and regulation, and by political and socio-cultural values regarding 
work). It is hard to see that digitalization has had positive effects here; in fact digital labour in 
general is strongly associated with exploitation and poor working conditions. Undoubtedly a 
major factor here was the backlash against labour that gained ground with the electoral 
successes of the right-wing political parties (crucially supported by conservative media) in the 
1980s and 1990s, and of a centre-left no longer committed to the democratization of labour or 
to justice in working lives. This meant that during the period in which the IT industries 
exploded, from the 1990s onwards, there was an increasing expectation or assumption that 
young workers should have to suffer very challenging working conditions (long hours on 
poor pay, with constantly changing demands), including prolonged and often unpaid 
internships, and multiple temporary jobs. Such working conditions in fact prevailed in artistic 
labour markets for decades before digitalization (Menger 2006) and the influence of the more 
glamorous and expanding IT sector (Neff 2012).seems only to have made things worse in 
artistic labour markets and in the media industries with which they are partly intertwined  
(Hesmondhalgh, 2019: 350-371) 
 
Even hopeful developments such as crowdfunding often lead to misunderstandings between 
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audiences and producers, and to self-exploitation on the part of the latter (Powers 2015). But 
the issues concerning the new digital culture in which many of us now live are not just a 
matter of quality of working life. Digital culture DOVRLQYROYHVWKHZD\WKDW¶XVHUV·, in return 
for an admittedly convenient abundance of entertainment and information on many subjects, 
are required to devote enormous amounts of time and energy to learning systems, and to 
updating apps and profiles, in order to keep up with the social competition of modern 
societies.   But might societies be over-valuing convenience at the expense of other good 
things? 
2XWFRPHWZRWKHULVHRI¶XVHU-JHQHUDWHGFRQWHQW· 
$OWKRXJK¶SLUDWH·VLWHVKDYHFRQWLQXHGWRSOD\DVLJQLILFDQWUROHLQFXUUHQWPHGLDV\VWHPV
more lastingly significant in terms of claims about democratization was the way in which 
digital networks seemed to afford the opportunity for non-professionals to have their voice 
heard beyond small and immediate circles of friends and acquaintances, thus supposedly 
threatening Characteristic 3 of twentieth-century media industries above (media production 
by the few, not the many). In this respect, blogging was a particularly notable phenomenon 
in the early 2000s, helping to fuel digital-optimist claims about the erosion of distinctions 
between amateur and professionals, producers and consumers (e.g., Bruns 2008 on the 
FRQFHSWRI¶SURGXVDJH·,) but also more thoughtful accounts about how the media presence of 
amateurs on a huge scale threatened traditional notions of journalism as a profession (e.g., 
6KLUN\(YHQPRUHVLJQLILFDQWZDVWKHRQVHWRI¶:HE·VLWHVWKDWDOORZHGXSORDGLQJ
labelling and sharing of content produced by amateurs and non-professionals. For example, 
three globally important sites that grew rapidly in the first years of the century were Flickr, 
for sharing photographs, YouTube for sharing video, and Myspace for sharing just about 
anything. A term widely used at the time for the rising phenomenon of users uploading 
content that they had created themselves to VXFKSODWIRUPVZDV¶XVHU-JHQHUDWHGFRQWHQW·RU
8*&:KHQWKHSKHQRPHQRQRI¶FURZGIXQGLQJ·HPHUJHG around 2007-8, along with 
specialist web-based funding sites such as Kickstarter, it was embraced by small and semi-
professional cultural producers (and by digital optimists) as a potential way of bypassing 
established media businesses, and weakening the grip of media-industry gatekeepers (a key 
feature of Characteristic 3) (Scott 2015). UGC sites continued to proliferate, even in the midst 
of financial crisis and austerity policies, including music sites such as SoundCloud, launched 
in Berlin in 2007, which hosts a vast array of musical and sound content, with special 
strengths in electronic dance music and hip hop. 
There can be little doubt that for those relatively privileged consumers who had access to the 
new digital networks, the developments just outlined rapidly led to greater choice, 
abundance and (that word again) convenience, including the availability of many products 
IRU¶IUHH·6RPHZRXOGLQWHUSret this as a kind of democratization, as a spreading and 
multiplication of voices, but to do so would be to ignore concentrations of power and 
attention, and fails to get at the crucial question of democratic control(YHQWKHVHHPLQJ¶IUHH-
QHVV·of such services often reflected a business model based on sustaining huge initial losses 
via massive financing, in order to later reap the rewards of market dominance, as was the 
FDVHZLWK<RX7XEHDQGLQGHHGPDQ\RIWKH¶SLUDWH·VLWHV6XFKDEXQGDQFHIRUEHWWHU-off 
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audiences did not equate to democratization. Nor did it fundamentally change the major 
characteristics of media industries in the twenty-first century, outlined above. We can see 
this by scrutinizing a major aspect of Characteristic 1 above ² the presence of corporations in 
the cultural sphere. 
 
Outcome three: Continuing power of corporations ² including a new set of IT giants 
 
Rather than unshackle media industries from the control of corporations, digitalization 
meant that the multinational media corporations that had for some decades (especially 
since the 1980s) dominated the production and distribution of culture in industrialized 
countries have now been joined by a new set of corporations from the IT industries. These 
corporations rapidly grew as vast financing rushed towards digital from the 1990s 
RQZDUGVHVSHFLDOO\DIWHUWKH\UHFRYHUHGIURPWKHEXUVWLQJRIWKH¶GRW-FRP·EXEEOHLQ
2000²01. The idea that the rising world of IT start-ups would be a major threat to corporate 
control soon evaporated. A critical moment was 2005²06, when the UGC sites referred to 
above were all acquired by vast IT or media corporations: Yahoo bought Flickr, Google 
bought YouTube and News Corporation bought Myspace. Flickr and Myspace declined 
rapidly as the social media giants Facebook, Twitter and Instagram grew, and absorbed 
many of the functions of those early social networks, supported by enormous amounts of 
financing and eventually advertising. This also resulted in the decline of many more local 
or national rather than global UGC sites that were popular before Facebook. Crucially, 
these corporations benefited from an extraordinary lack of democratic oversight and 
regulation ² a product of the neo-liberal flavour of the times, and awe on the part of 
governments at the economic potential of the IT industry. 
The best known of the new IT giants are of course Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple, the 
famous GAFA tech oligopoly, sometimes including Microsoft to make up GAFAM. These 
companies are extremely diverse, to the point where some commentators understandably 
question whether there is value in the concept of GAFA(M) at all. It certainly is essential to 
look beyond these four or five corporations when understanding the new and expanding role 
of IT businesses in media industries. But the giants of GAFA do have something important in 
FRPPRQWKHLUPDVVLYHYLVLEOHDQGEUDQGHGSUHVHQFHLQSHRSOH·VHYHU\GD\DFWVRIFRPSXWHU-
mediated communication, as opposed to IT corporations such as Intel (who make chips) or 
Palantir (data analytics), whose presence is less immediately evident in everyday life. They 
are also supplemented by the vast Chinese corporations that operate behind, and 
LQFUHDVLQJO\EH\RQGWKHGLJLWDO¶*UHDW)LUHZDOORI&KLQD· 
The GAFA corporations, and the IT sector in general, were crucially involved in the unfolding 
of digitalization in the second decade of the twenty first century. The further developments 
they have played a major part in bringing about make it clear that hopes that digitalization 
would lead to media democratization did not transpire. Again, recorded music was in the 
vanguard of change. In the wake of the crisis in that industry, Apple, which had established 
itself as a major player in music with the launch of the iPod in 2001, began to work closely 
ZLWKWKHPDMRUUHFRUGFRPSDQLHVWRGHYHORSDVLWHIRUVHOOLQJ¶OHJDO·GLJLWDOILOHVRIPXVLFDQG
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to some extent video, via its iTunes site. In fact, the iTunes era proved to be rather short-lived, 
because Apple made a much more lasting intervention in cultural distribution via the launch 
of its iPhone in 2007 and of the App Store in 2008, the latter of which made third party 
VRIWZDUHHDVLO\DYDLODEOHWR¶HDUO\DGRSWHU·FRQVXPHUV&RPELQHGZLWKDQHTXLYDOHQWYHQWXUH
by Google for its Android platform (eventually known as Google Play) that soon followed, 
$SSOH·VDSSVWRUHprovided a chance for various emerging IT companies to gain access to the 
new world of digitally-networked devices, including smartphones, tablets and laptops, and 
eventually smart TVs. 
It is in the context of the rise of streaming services (see Outcome one above) that we see 
most clearly the way in which media digitalization has opened the way for IT corporations 
to collaborate and/or compete with media corporations. Outside the Chinese market, Apple 
and Spotify currently dominate music streaming. It is difficult to equate their extraordinary 
global presence in this new crucial arena of music-industry activity with democratization, in 
fact their operations are extremely opaque, the subject of endless speculation on the part of 
musicians, audiences and other music businesses, including controversies over rates of 
payment (Marshall 2015). 
From 2010 onwards, Netflix and Amazon Prime, both of them essentially IT companies, 
rapidly became dominant forces in video streaming internationally, supplemented by online 
streaming services established by media companies such as HBO; Disney and Apple are set to 
join them as I write in 2018. In the television industry in many countries, on-demand 
streaming represents a threat to previously dominant cable and satellite companies, and to 
free-to-DLU¶EURDGFDVWHUV·LQFOXGLQJWKHSXEOLFVHUYLFHPHGLDWKDWKDYHJHQHUDOO\VHUYHGWKH
public interest well in many countries (Evens and Donders 2018). Importantly, the IT 
corporations are now very heavily involved in the commissioning of content ² Netflix led the 
way in this respect, and other, bigger tech companies (notably Amazon and now Apple) have 
followed. The vast resources being poured into television as IT and media corporations jockey 
for advantage has led to a vast proliferation of expensive audio-YLVXDO¶WHOHYLVLRQ-OLNH·
SURJUDPPLQJWKDWVRPHKDYHUHIHUUHGWRDV¶SHDN79·3UHVV2QFHDJDLQWKRXJKZH
should not confuse financial resources and abundance with genuine diversity and a socially 
just media system. The IT corporations are set to become the major players in the digitalized 
media-industries system, and this is not a matter of democratization. 
Outcome four: Continuation of the blockbuster and few-to-many system 
 
The profusion of music, television and film enabled by digitalization and streaming may be 
considered a blessing, especially for highly educated audiences, and as the number of 
corporations involved in music and television has grown to include IT companies as well as 
media corporations, it has become possible for some economists to understand this as 
increased competition (see Noam 2016 for a comprehensive examination of such issues). But 
even if this is the case, does it represent democratization? Admittedly, in relation to 
Characteristic 3 (media production by the few not the many), more people than ever before 
can now share cultural products that they have been involved in creating, for example in the 
form of blogs, vlogs and social media postings. Sometimes such products can be circulated 
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internationally. Are we now in a many to many media system, rather than the few-to-many 
system of the twentieth century? Is this threatening the blockbuster syndrome that sustains 
corporate domination and international inequality (Characteristic 4)? 
7KHFRQFHSWRI¶WKHORQJWDLO·DOORZVXVWRFRQVLGHUHYLGHQFHDERXWVXFKTXHVWLRQV7KLVZDV
MRXUQDOLVWDQGDXWKRU&KULV$QGHUVRQ·VLGHDWKDWPHGLDDQGWKHPHGLDLQGXVWULHVDQGLQGHHG
modern economies in general) were moving away from a situation whereby hits generate 
most of the attention and profit (cf. Characteristic 3) towards one where millions of niche 
markets add up to a market that matches or exceeds that of the hits, partly because of the 
ability of online digital services to provide vast catalogues (Anderson 2006). But studies have 
shown that on digital retail sites (such as iTunes, nearly defunct as of 2018), most music 
available digitally was not purchased at all, and that on streaming sites, most music remains 
more or less unheard; big hits remain the source of the vast majority of income (Page and 
Garland 2009; Elberse 2014). Digital music streaming platforms contain vast catalogues, but 
much of the material remains unaccessed, for the simple reason (presumably) that people 
GRQ·WNQRZLW·VWKHUH)RUH[DPSOH6SRWLI\UHSRUWHGLQWKDWSHUFHQWRILWVPLOOLRQ
track catalogue had never been accesseG(SVWHLQ:KDW·VPRUHWKHEORFNEXVWHU
syndrome remains alive and well (Elberse, 2014), partly because firms need to spend more 
money than ever on marketing in order to break through the clutter of abundance to make 
their products known. Those corporations that can spend that money are set to maintain 
dominance, though in a context of much greater corporate rivalry than in previous years. For 
example, just fourteen Disney films accounted for one-fifth of global film revenue in 2016 
(Epstein 2017). 
Some would claim in response that some aspects of digital networks have led to some 
democratization in Characteristic 3, because a greater number of creators are now able to 
bypass media industry gatekeepers, and break through from anonymity to success and fame. 
For example, it is common to read and hear about musical acts breaking through into the 
mainstream media industries via YouTube, such as Canadian pop superstar Justin Bieber. It 
would be a mistake to confuse such mobility with democratization. Bieber·VPDQDJHU6FRRWHU
%UDXQGLVFRYHUHGKLPZKLOHVHDUFKLQJ<RX7XEHIRUDQRWKHUDUWLVW$WWKHWLPH%LHEHU¶KDG
RQO\¶VL[RUHLJKW·YLGHRVRQKLVDFFRXQWZLWKDIHZWKRXVDQGYLHZVHDFK·+HUUHUD7KH
ambitious Braun had experience at a fairly high level in music industry marketing and once 
Bieber and his mother moved to Atlanta to join him, Bieber was soon signed to a major 
record label, Island-'HI-DPSDUWRI8QLYHUVDOWKHZRUOG·VELJJHVWUHFRUGFRPSDQ\,QHIIHFW
YouTube (and less prominent sites such as SoundCloud) now operate as online versions of 
the kinds of informal and semi-professional economies from which creators and artists have 
for a long time emerged. It is true that social media and UGC sites such as YouTube have 
paved the way for new modes of celebrity such as beauty vloggers and gaming 
commentators, who establish their reputations on the basis of constructing a sense of 
authenticity and an ability to form a relationship of trust and intimacy with their viewers. But 
in order to reach beyond a rather small community, such celebrities are absorbed into 
institutions that pursue PR, promotion and branding, and when knowledge of this leaks out 
to fans, this can threaten the sense of authenticity that has been so carefully constructed 
(Jerslev 2016). Audiences are increasingly savvy about how this works, but such savviness 
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hardly seems to undermine the existing system. 
Reasons for concern, reasons for hope 
 
I have shown that the hopes invested in digitalization as a means of media democratization 
have generally not been realized. Perhaps this was always a case of optimistic 
commentators investing too much hope in technology, and failing to engage with all the 
other economic, political and cultural factors that might be at work. And with the 
developments outlined above, new problems and new concerns have arisen. One particular 
area of increasing disquiet is the way in which powerful corporations can make use of data, 
and related issues of surveillance (Andrejevic 2YDQ'LMFNVHHDOVR$OLVRQ3RZHOO·V
contribution to this volume). Not all uses of data by governments and businesses are 
equally problematic (see Kennedy 2016). However, entering into the new digital media eco-
system now regularly involves submitting information about oneself to the most powerful 
data-gathering forces on the planet. The actual and potential power of IT corporations to 
harness and analyze data is extremely opaque. There has been extraordinarily little 
democratic regulation of it, though this is beginning to change (for example, with the 
(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·V*HQHUDO'DWD3URWHFWLRQ5HJXODWLRQLPSOHPHQWHGLQ<HW
some digital optimists treat the gathering and analysis of data as if its main function is to 
allow companies such as Netflix to serve customers better through the refinement of 
algorithmic systems (Smith and Telang 2016). It is hard to assess this notion of a trade-off of 
privacy for convenient abundance, partly because there needs to be much greater social 
debate about what ¶VHUYLQJFXVWRPHUV well·PLJKWDFWXDOO\PHDQDQGDOVREHFDXVHWKH
ability of companies such as Netflix to use data as a basis for programming decisions is 
often celebrated, but rarely specified. Another concern is the degree to which it is even 
possible to opt out of the new digital systems of communication and culture (Mejias 2013). 
And I have already discussed above the worrying implications for work, for how we spend 
our time, and for quality of life. 
A couple of cynical friends, when I told them the title of this chapter, commented that the 
chapter FRXOGEHNHSWPXFKVKRUWHUE\VLPSO\W\SLQJWKHZRUG¶QR·Their humorous 
implication was that intelligent people now recognize that the dream of digital 
democratization was a sad delusion. But the effects of digital networks should not be 
understood entirely as a matter of corporate capture and commercialization, undermining 
any hopes of democratization. Wikipedia is not perfect (see Ford and Wajcman 2017 on its 
problematic gender politics) but it has been a rare example of a UGC site where the ideals of 
the computing cultures of academics and enthusiasts held firm: rather than take advertising, 
it adopted a non-SURILWPRGHOEDVHGRQGRQDWLRQV:KDW·VPRUHWKHFULVLVLQMRXUQDOLVPKDV
led to a proliferation of new ways in which journalism that serves the public interest and the 
common good might be funded (Konieczna 2018). 
:HQHHGDOVRWRUHFRJQL]HWKHFXOWXUDOFRPSOH[LW\RI<RX7XEHDQGRWKHU¶FRUSRUDWH·GLJLWDO
platforms, and avoid over-reacting against naïve digital optimism by implying that our 
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understanding of the digital realm can be reduced to corporate ownership. As a valuable 
book on YouTube points out (Burgess and Green 2018: vii, 151), participatory culture 
UHPDLQV<RX7XEH·VFRUHEXVLQHVVIRXQGHGRQ¶FXOWXUDOORJLFVRIFRPPXQLW\RSHQQHVVDQG
DXWKHQWLFLW\·<RX7XEHLVDYDVWK\EULGSODWIRUPFRPELQLQJDOONLQGVRIDPDWHXUDQG
professional content. Arguably it has been the main force in developing a new cultural 
PRGH¶VRFLDOPHGLDHQWHUWDLQPHQW·ZKLFKVRPHDQDO\VWVFRQVLGHUWREHPRUHYDULHGDQG
diverse than corporate media. 
Cunningham and Craig (2019), for example, argue that Asian American and LGBTQ 
creators have greater visibility and influence in this emergent industry than in 
mainstream television. It is possible for disempowered groups and communities ² some 
of them with relatively democratic ways of conducting their business ² to make use of 
ZHEWHOHYLVLRQWRVHHNDXGLHQFHVE\SDVVLQJWKHFRQWURORI¶OHJDF\·WHOHYLVLRQDV$\PDU
Jean Christian (2018) recounts in a recent book. In this volume, Punathambekar and 
0RKDQVKRZKRZ<RX7XEHKDVEHFRPHDVSDFHZKHUHSURJUDPPLQJLQWKH¶UHJLRQDO·
languages of India has been used to challenge the hegemony of Hindi and English in that 
country. 
Yet even taking into account such examples, there are limitations in how YouTube and other 
UGC platforms can be understood as a democratization of the production and consumption 
of media and culture. As Burgess and Green (2018: 151) recognize, cultural logics of 
community and open-ness on YouTube are in tension with corporate logics. Advertising 
abounds on the platform, and participatory culture itself now means something very 
different from what it did in 2005, in a world where the effects of social media on sociality 
and democracy are widely seen as at best troubling, and at worst dangerous. 
 
There is no doubt that digitalization has offered abundance, convenience and mobility of 
information and entertainment. An urgent question facing students and researchers of media 
and culture is whether that should be at the expense of democratic oversight of, and social 
justice within, culture and communication. As more and more people become aware of the 
downsides of seductive systems of digital media, the case for greater democratic control of, or 
oversight of, the media industries and related tech industries grows stronger. What forms such 
democratization might take has to be the subject of other essays, other books, hopefully 
building on some of the earlier research on democratization cited above (e.g., Downing, 2000). 
Marketized media do not per se guarantee media freedoms any more than state-owned media 
(see Baker 2002). Of course, some would argue that any significant change is impossible, that 
the nature of the capitDOLVWV\VWHPLVVRHQWUHQFKHGWKDWGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQLQWKHVHQVHWKDW,·YH
used it here simply cannot happen. But my view is that we should not give up on the idea that 
it is possible or desirable for citizens to exercise much greater control over modern economic, 
political, technological and other systems, in spite of their complexity and the undoubted 
difficulties of collective decision-making. To give up on such collective deliberation is to 
abandon something vital about how people might live together. Only by challenging the main 
ways in which media industries are owned and controlled are we likely to see a significant 
improvement in how they represent and mediate the world, and we cannot now go back to the 
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twentieth-century system. We need new democratic media systems for a digital age. 
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